Health and Hedonism in Plato and Epicurus by Kelly Arenson;

Author:Kelly Arenson;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury UK

7

Epicureans on Taste, Sex, and Other Non-Restorative Pleasures

In the previous chapters, I argued that kinetic pleasure is the perceived movement toward painless functioning, that is, the perception of the organism’s restoration to a healthy state; katastematic pleasure is the perceived painless state itself, and this is understood as the perception of the healthy, stable condition of the organism. At first glance it is unclear how this classification can accommodate what appears to be a third type of pleasure: non-restorative, painless sensory variations (which I hereafter call ‘non-restorative pleasures’), such as those of taste, sex, vision, and hearing. Epicurus is on record as saying that such pleasures are important to his conception of the highest good (Tusc. Disp. 3.41–42), no doubt fueling the polemical charge that Epicureanism is profligacy disguised as a serious philosophical theory. Hence Cicero’s humorous quip, “Epicurus appears to be looking for disciples, so that those who wish to be dissolute first become philosophers” (De Fin. 2.30).

Most scholars classify the non-restorative pleasures as kinetic, following Cicero.1 The exceptions are Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Nikolsky (2001), whose general interpretation of non-restorative pleasure I develop here.2 Contrary to the dominant scholarly view, I argue that there is good reason to avoid classifying non-restorative pleasures as kinetic since they are not derived from movements toward painless, healthy functioning. In this chapter I contend that pleasures from taste, sex, sound, etc., are painless in themselves and are therefore katastematic; no matter whether they occur in the midst of pain (such as when we enjoy tasty food when hungry) or are isolated from pain (when we enjoy dessert after filling up on dinner), they are perceptions of the painless workings of the organism.

Naturally, the view that non-restorative pleasures are katastematic is not without potential problems. The first of these problems concerns Epicurus’ assertion in KD 18 that pleasure can only be varied but not increased beyond the removal of all pain. Because the passage seems to contrast certain pleasures that do not contribute to the ultimate end of absence of pain with the absence of pain itself, many scholars conclude that KD 18 presents strong support for the view that non-restorative pleasures, such as those of sex and taste, are kinetic rather than katastematic.3 In response to this objection, I contend that my reading of Epicurean pleasure has more success at resolving several interpretive problems with KD 18 than does the view that non-restorative pleasures are kinetic. In any case, the objection collapses if non-restorative pleasures are in fact katastematic. Secondly, I address possible challenges to my reading that might arise from several passages in the works of the Epicureans Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda, both of whom discuss non-restorative pleasures, usually in the context of attacking Cyrenaic views. Some scholars contend that Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda believe non-restorative pleasures are kinetic, but I will argue that this is unlikely.

Before turning to Epicurean descriptions of non-restorative pleasures, one might wonder what precludes the kinetic class from including both restorative and non-restorative pleasure.

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